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A B S T R A C T
Measurement of quality and safety has an important role in improving healthcare, but is susceptible to unin-
tended consequences. One frequently made argument is that optimising the beneﬁts from measurement requires
controlling the risks of blame, but whether it is possible to do this remains unclear. We examined responses to a
programme known as the NHS Safety Thermometer (NHS-ST). Measuring four common patient harms in diverse
care settings with the goal of supporting local improvement, the programme explicitly eschews a role for blame.
The study design was ethnographic. We conducted 115 hours of observation across 19 care organisations and
conducted 126 interviews with frontline staﬀ, senior national leaders, experts in the four harms, and the NHS-ST
programme leadership and development team. We also collected and analysed relevant documents.
The programme theory of the NHS-ST was based in a logic of measurement for improvement: the designers of
the programme sought to avoid the appropriation of the data for any purpose other than supporting improve-
ment. However, organisational participants - both at frontline and senior levels - were concerned that the NHS-
ST functioned latently as a blame allocation device. These perceptions were inﬂuenced, ﬁrst, by ﬁeld-level logics
of accountability and managerialism and, second, by speciﬁc features of the programme, including public re-
porting, ﬁnancial incentives, and ambiguities about deﬁnitions that ampliﬁed the concerns. In consequence,
organisational participants, while they identiﬁed some merits of the programme, tended to identify and cate-
gorise it as another example of performance management, rich in potential for blame.
These ﬁndings indicate that the search to optimise the beneﬁts of measurement by controlling the risks of
blame remains challenging. They further suggest that a well-intentioned programme theory, while necessary,
may not be suﬃcient for achieving goals for improvement in healthcare systems dominated by institutional
logics that run counter to the programme theory.
1. Introduction
Quality measurement that focuses on important processes and out-
comes, including clinical care and patient experience, is often seen as an
essential feature of well-functioning healthcare systems (Conway et al.,
2013). Prominent uses of measurement include identifying variations in
care between diﬀerent organisations or practitioners, surfacing the
factors associated with high performance, and supporting replication
and scaling of apparently successful approaches (Bradley et al., 2012).
Measurement is a deﬁning characteristic of many quality improvement
eﬀorts, where techniques such as statistical process control and audit
and feedback are routinely deployed to help practitioners monitor their
local system performance and the responses of that system to im-
provement interventions (Portela et al., 2015; Ivers et al., 2012). In-
creasingly, measurement is also deployed in the context of performance
management regimes and as an element of pay-for-performance
schemes to address the demand for accountability and transparency
that has become one of the central tropes of current thinking on
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governance and regulation in modern healthcare (Mukamel et al., 2014;
Brewster et al., 2016). These diﬀering goals of measurement embody a
number of tensions, including those relating to the balance between
stimulating improvement and provoking unintended consequences –
such as gaming (manipulation of data to look good), eﬀort substitution
(focus on the things being measured to the exclusion of other important
activities) (Kelman and Friedman, 2009), shrinkage of professional re-
sponsibility (narrow focus on the things being measured) and excessive
bureaucratic burden associated with data collection and reporting
(Chassin et al., 2010; Meyer et al., 2012). The question of whether it is
possible to capture the potential beneﬁts of measurement while mini-
mising the risks is thus a critical one.
One frequently made argument is that optimising the yield from
measurement (and, conversely, averting its unwanted eﬀects) requires
controlling the risks of blame. Solberg et al.'s much-cited article (Solberg
et al., 1997) distinguishes measurement for improvement from measure-
ment for accountability, proposing that the appropriation of locally col-
lected data for external accountability purposes may thwart the goal of
improvement. These authors argue that only when fear and blame are
“out of the equation”, can everyone “concentrate on improvement ra-
ther than defensiveness” (p.138). Yet cultures of blame are pervasive in
healthcare (Dekker and Hugh, 2014), resulting, Don Berwick argues, in
measurement fostering fear and defensiveness rather than improved
quality and safety:
Any good foreman knows how clever a frightened work force can be. In
fact, practically no system of measurement - at least none that measures
people's performance - is robust enough to survive the fear of those who
are measured […] The inspector says, "I will ﬁnd you out if you are
deﬁcient." The subject replies, "I will therefore prove I am not deﬁcient" -
and seeks not understanding, but escape. (Berwick, 1989:53)
It remains unclear, however, whether it is possible to design and
operate measurement systems for improving healthcare quality that
evade the apparently negative eﬀects of blame: ﬁeld studies of mea-
surement of quality and safety have remained rare (Dixon-Woods et al.,
2012).
We suggest one useful way of gaining clarity and analytic purchase
is to understand “data for accountability” and “data for improvement”
as two diﬀerent logics. We propose, as a more general principle, that
quality improvement (QI) eﬀorts founded in a particular logic may be
overwhelmed by institutional logics operating at the ﬁeld level. We
provide empirical support for this analysis using an ethnographic study
of a large-scale data collection programme in England. Known as the
NHS Safety Thermometer, the programme is of particular interest for
our purposes because it explicitly embraced a principle of “data for
improvement” that eschewed a role for blame.
1.1. Blame
It is useful to begin by acknowledging that, though blame is widely
discussed in the healthcare literature and at policy level, for example in
relation to patient safety (Wachter and Pronovost, 2009), its deﬁnition
tends to be somewhat vernacular. Political science, by contrast, has
developed an extensive literature on blame that oﬀers some helpful
pointers to a more formal approach. Christopher Hood, for example,
deﬁnes blame as the act of attributing something bad or wrong to some
person or entity (Hood, 2011:6); it involves some (actual or perceived)
harm or loss, as well as, crucially, an attribution of agency. Though he
emphasises that blame is not always bad, Hood explains that, faced
with external demands for accountability, blame avoidance may be-
come a dominant preoccupation for organisations and institutions.
Many political science analyses oﬀer a fairly muscular view of
blame avoidance and blame engineering, describing a range of tech-
niques and strategies that are purposefully chosen and implemented
with speciﬁc (albeit often undeclared) intentions of deﬂecting or
evading blame. We propose that, though much of the scrutiny has
focused on the deliberate or purposeful creation of blame engineering
schemes, it is possible for a system to function latently as a blame
distribution and attribution system even when not designed with that
goal in mind – or indeed, even, as we shall show using the example of
the NHS Safety Thermometer, when it seeks explicitly to disavow a role
in blaming.
1.2. The NHS Safety Thermometer
The declared aim of England's NHS Safety Thermometer (NHS-ST)
programme is to “provide a quick and simple method for surveying
patient harms and analysing results so that you can measure and
monitor local improvement and harm-free care over time” (NHS
Digital, 2017). The four harms measured by the NHS-ST tool – pressure
ulcers, harm from falls, urinary infection in patients with catheters, and
venous thromboembolism (VTE) – account for a large proportion of
avoidable injury in healthcare settings, and incur high human and
economic costs (Power et al., 2016). Patients who incur none of these
harms are deemed “harm-free”.
The programme requires that staﬀ caring for NHS patients England-
wide in hospitals or community nursing settings (e.g. patients’ homes)
record the presence and severity of the four harms on a pre-speciﬁed
day each month. The NHS-ST thus creates a monthly census amounting
to approximately 200,000 patients. Data collection is the responsibility
of frontline teams, who are asked to record information according to
the deﬁnitions in Table 1. The resulting data, which are entered into
spreadsheets and aggregated at organisational, regional, and national
levels, are publicly available online along with national benchmarking
data. Following a 2011 pilot, the NHS-ST was introduced across Eng-
land (Power et al., 2016). Since 2012/13 use of the NHS-ST has at-
tracted ﬁnancial incentives. A Commissioning for Quality and Innova-
tion (CQUIN) payment was introduced in 2012/13 in which a ﬁnancial
reward was linked to data collection, with the aim of establishing a
baseline. Other incentives were introduced over time; since 2015 the
NHS Standard Contract has required the collection of data on a monthly
basis using the NHS-ST or another local collection method.
1.3. Programme theories and institutional logics
The NHS-ST and its associated policy framework can be understood
as a quality improvement (QI) programme (Portela et al., 2015). Recent
years have seen growing recognition of the importance of explicating
the theories or models that underlie such programmes (Davidoﬀ et al.,
2015), including elaboration of the causal assumptions – what is
sometimes known as a programme's “logic”. Even when QI programmes
appear to have a sound underpinning theory and logic, success is often
evasive (Dixon-Woods and Martin, 2016). Many reasons for such fail-
ures can be identiﬁed, but one that has remained little examined, de-
spite its rich explanatory potential, lies in the relationship between
programme theories and institutional logics.
First proposed as a feature of institutional theory more than 25
years ago (Friedland and Alford, 1991), the literature on institutional
logics has expanded greatly over the last quarter century, and now
accommodates several diﬀerent deﬁnitions. Broadly, however, it pro-
poses that large-scale supraorganisational social structures tend to be
characterised by distinctive sets of assumptions, values, beliefs, prac-
tices, and symbolic constructions (Friedland and Alford, 1991), oﬀering
repertoires to social actors that constrain - though do not fully de-
termine - their choices, behaviours, and understandings. Friedland and
Alford's original work focused on the central institutions of the con-
temporary West, such as professions, markets, and bureaucracies, but
later theorists identiﬁed a hierarchical character to logics, such that
“organisational ﬁelds and industries are viewed as having their own
logics nested within societal level institutional orders” (Goodrick and
Reay, 2011:375).
Though institutional logics contribute to the relatively stable nature
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of institutions over time, to the extent that they provide the organising
principles for patterned behaviours, practices and symbols, they are
nonetheless susceptible to alteration and transformation. Some change
is linked to responses to the multiple other logics that may co-exist and
potentially conﬂict or become more or less dominant over time
(Greenwood et al., 2010); other change is linked to the agentic beha-
viour of individuals and organisations. However, empirically informed
understanding of under what conditions a particular logic may appear
most compelling and/or most directive of practice has remained limited
(Martin et al., 2016). Even more poorly understood is the fate of a
programme theory when introduced in an institutional ﬁeld where a
particular logic is especially inﬂuential.
In this article, we report a study of responses to the NHS-ST pro-
gramme from multiple levels of the healthcare system. We explore the
dissonances between the theory of change underlying the programme
and an institutional logic of performance measurement, and in so doing
show how the institutional logic displaced the programme theory's ef-
fort to eradicate blame and promote the beneﬁts of measurement.
2. Methods
2.1. Study setting
Our study involved 19 NHS organisations in England (anonymised
as sites A-S) that were participating in NHS-ST data collection and re-
porting. We used purposive sampling to ensure diversity of type and
size as well as diﬀerent levels of reported harm. Organisations were
grouped into categories according to their type; we randomly selected
within these. The sample included ten acute hospitals, two specialist
hospitals, ﬁve community healthcare organisations, and two integrated
healthcare organisations (providers of both acute and community ser-
vices). Sample size was kept under review as the study progressed; 19
organisations was enough to ensure suﬃcient diversity.
2.2. Data collection
The study design was ethnographic, involving observations, inter-
views and documentary analysis. (Dixon-Woods and Bosk, 2010). Our
model for data collection was the same in all organisations: observation
of NHS-ST data collection and reporting by frontline staﬀ on one
monthly data collection day; interviews with frontline and senior staﬀ;
and collection of relevant local documentation. There were two in-
stances in which this model could not be followed in full: at one site
only NHS-ST data input and not collection was observed due to prac-
tical constraints; and at another site we did interviews only and no
observation at the site's request. In total we completed ∼115 hours of
observations, averaging 6.4 hours per site. Researchers were blinded to
the reported rates in organisations they visited. Observers, all of whom
were non-clinical researchers, took written ﬁeldnotes and produced
accounts of their visits that were transcribed in full. Two team de-
brieﬁng sessions including reﬂection of the impact of the researchers on
the data were also conducted.
Table 1
Oﬃcial Guidance and Deﬁnitions for use of the NHS Safety Thermometer.
Category and deﬁnition Values
Age
Collected in 3 age bands
< 18
18–70
>70
Gender Male
Female
Old Pressure Ulcers
An ‘old’ pressure ulcer is deﬁned as being a pressure ulcer that was present when the patient came under your care, or
developed within 72 h of admission to your organisation.
None
Category 2
Category 3
Category 4
New Pressure Ulcers
New pressure ulcer developed 72 h (3 days) or more after admission to organisation.
The category of the patient's worst new pressure ulcers is recorded.
None
Category 2
Category 3
Category 4
Patient Falls
Any fall that the patient has experienced within the previous 72 h in a care setting (including home if the patient is on a
district nursing caseload).
The severity of the fall is deﬁned in accordance with NRLS [National Reporting and Learning System] categories.
None
No harm
Low harm
Moderate harm
Severe harm
Death
Catheters
An indwelling urethral urinary catheter in place at any point in the last 72 h.
Record the number of days that it has been in place.
If the patient has not had indwelling urethral urinary catheter in place at any point in the last 72 h, record No catheter
1-28 days
28 + days
Days unknown
No catheter
UTIs [Urinary Tract Infections]
Any patient being treated for a UTI.
Record if the treatment started before the patient was admitted to your organisation (Old) or after admission to your
organisation (New).
Treatment for a UTI is based on clinical notes, clinical judgement and patient feedback.
No UTI
Old UTI
New UTI
VTE [Venous Thromboembolism] Assessments
Is there a documented VTE Risk assessment?
No
Yes
N/A
VTE Prophalyaxis
If the patient is at risk, has VTE prophylaxis started?
No
Yes
N/A
VTE Treatment
If the patient is being treated for VTE choose the type of VTE.
Use old VTE where the patient had the VTE before admission.
Use new VTE where the patient developed the VTE after admission.
No VTE
Old DVT [deep vein thrombosis] Old
PE [pulmonary embolism]
Old Other
New DVT
New PE
New Other
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As well as the ethnographic observations, we undertook interviews
in the same sites with 38 senior staﬀ with strategic responsibility for
NHS-ST activity (mostly with director-level responsibility for nursing,
patient safety, or QI) and 52 frontline staﬀ (mostly ward nurses and
community nurses). These interviews sought to interrogate further the
approaches to data collection we had observed, and gather staﬀ's per-
ceptions of and attitudes towards the NHS-ST. We further interviewed
four regional and national NHS leaders and 27 content experts in the
four harms, comprising six with specialist expertise in VTE, ﬁve in
pressure ulcers, eight in UTIs, seven in falls, and one with an overview
of all four harms. We also interviewed ﬁve individuals from the NHS-ST
leadership and development team, all of whom had been involved in
the NHS-ST's design and/or national implementation.
The 126 interviews and all observation accounts and debriefs were
audio-recorded and professionally transcribed verbatim, with tran-
scriptions checked for accuracy against recordings. We also collected
relevant national NHS-ST documentation (e.g. guidance and forms
publicly available on the NHS-ST website) and local documentation
(e.g. customised forms, local brieﬁng material) at 10 sites.
2.3. Data analysis
A systematic and iterative approach based on the constant com-
parative method was used to analyse the data (Charmaz, 2006). A
subset of data was initially open-coded, allowing identiﬁcation of
provisional thematic categories. This was followed by repeated close
readings of the data to generate a thematic framework that was then
tested and reﬁned concurrently with data collection before being ap-
plied to the full dataset. Individual transcripts were compared and
contrasted, and deviant cases identiﬁed and explored, in order to ensure
a detailed understanding of how the NHS-ST tool was being used in
diﬀerent contexts. NVivo 10 software was used to support the coding,
management and retrieval of data.
This project was deemed to constitute service evaluation using the
criteria speciﬁed in the UK's National Research Ethics Service Guidance
(Health Research Authority, 2013) and thus did not fall under the de-
ﬁnition of research. In order to assure the ethical standing of this study,
we nonetheless gained approval from a University of Leicester Com-
mittee for Research Ethics Concerning Human Subjects. Informed
consent was obtained from all interview participants, and verbal per-
mission was obtained for observations. We also followed site-speciﬁc
procedures for registering service evaluations as appropriate.
3. Findings
We organise our ﬁndings below to show how the NHS-ST was un-
derpinned by a programme theory that emphasised how the tool was
intended to facilitate local improvement through objective, trustworthy
measurement, free of the corrosive eﬀects of blame. We show also that
the organisational participants charged with using the NHS-ST tool
painted a diﬀerent picture: these participants saw the NHS-ST primarily
as a blame allocation device, informed by their previous experiences of
performance management and accountability and by institutional fea-
tures of the organisation of the NHS-ST programme. Ambiguities of
measurement and widespread concerns about the tool's role in allo-
cating responsibility for harm led to concerns about fairness. As a result,
participants largely saw the NHS-ST as a way not of taking the tem-
perature of their organisations and using it to improve care, but as a
way of distributing heat – the potential for blame. The reasons for this,
we propose, lay in the inﬂuence of an institutional logic of account-
ability which displaced or overwhelmed the programme logic.
3.1. NHS Safety Thermometer programme theory
Interviews with the NHS-ST leadership and development team
(hereafter “NHS-ST team”) about the principles underlying its
development, together with analysis of oﬃcial documentation and
published literature, suggested that the NHS-ST could be said to have
what Carol Weiss terms an articulated programme theory (Weiss, 1997).
The goal of the programme was clear: it was to facilitate local im-
provement through standardised measurement across diﬀerent health-
care contexts and settings in order to make visible, prioritisable, and
actionable harms to patients that were otherwise obscured. The harm-
free care concept - absence of all four harms - was designed to oﬀer an
alternative to surveillance of individual conditions (e.g. pressure ulcers)
by focusing on the individual patient level. The NHS-ST would achieve
its aims, its developers proposed, by providing the means to produce
practical, straightforward, unambiguous, and locally valuable data to
enable front-line teams to monitor their performance with a minimum
of diﬃculty and to identify opportunities for improvement, free of the
need to worry about attribution of blame.
[It's about] thinking more of it as a tool within the kind of continuous
improvement work that everybody wants to, to undertake and drive
forward. […] So very much a kind of utilising data for improvement
ethos. (NHS-ST Team Member 5)
The NHS ST is designed to focus on the patient and not on attribution
(whose fault is it) or avoid-ability of harm. It accepts that not all harm is
avoidable but works on the premise that a signiﬁcant amount is and that
users are working towards a goal of ‘deﬁning the possible’ in their system.
Attribution is used only as a key to system learning. The NHS ST is an
attempt to shift our focus from blame to learning. (Durkin et al., 2015)
In both interviews with the NHS-ST team and in programme doc-
umentation, achievement of the programme's goals was seen as relying
on making available a neutral and trusted form of instrumentation that
could “take the temperature”. The NHS-ST team described speciﬁcally
seeking to avoid the issues that had challenged other NHS performance
metrics, such as onerous microbiological or diagnostic criteria and
complex weighting of indicators. They emphasised that they had sought
to produce deﬁnitions that would be straightforward, clear and prac-
tical to use in multiple care settings and that would maximise the value
and immediacy of the information for clinical teams. These considera-
tions meant that pragmatism tended to prevail in the formulation of the
deﬁnitions.
We wanted an instrument that we could do in ten minutes per patient …
If each of the harm areas [meaning content experts within them] wanted
more done and more detail, we had to constantly come back to that
principle. (NHS-ST Team Member 1)
Though the tool had the potential to be used to provide comparative
insights at the level of health economies, organisations and teams, the
NHS-ST team was insistent that was not the intent: instead, it was to
support organisations in monitoring the eﬀectiveness of their own im-
provement initiatives using robust and meaningful local data, con-
sistent with the principle that the data should not be used for blame.
One of the things that we, and still do now, is to make clear that this isn't
about comparing organisations, it's about using the information within
your organisation to do quality improvement - to understand how good
you are, and then to track your progress as you make changes that you
hypothesise will improve the outcomes for patients, that's what it’s useful
for. (NHS-ST Team Member 4)
Many of these basic goals and assumptions of the NHS-ST pro-
gramme theory were understood and accepted by some participants in
our study, including NHS leaders, senior staﬀ in organisations that
collected NHS-ST data, content experts, and a few frontline staﬀ. As
proposed by the programme theory, these individuals saw measurement
through the NHS-ST as enabling problems that were previously oc-
cluded to become visible, thus facilitating assessment of size and scope
of quality issues, and enabling identiﬁcation of targets for action and
monitoring of change.
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For me, it creates awareness for us all, how [the] patient is doing … and
then also it helps to improve upon some practices. (Site L, Frontline
Staﬀ 1)
I liked it, because it was a blunt instrument that helps staﬀ recognise that
they were harming patients and to do something about it … Putting focus
on those four harms made people think about what they were doing on a
day-to-day basis. (NHS Senior Leader 3)
3.2. Institutional logics and the NHS Safety Thermometer as a blame
allocation device
Positive views of the NHS-ST were not shared by everyone, nor was
there universal acceptance of the basics of the programme theory.
Identifying dissonances between the programme theory of the NHS-ST
as a blame-neutral, locally-owned instrument, many organisational
participants rejected a view of the tool as a straightforward, objective
means of taking the temperature of safety in their organisations to
support local improvement. Few frontline staﬀ reported using the data
in practice, instead interpreting the purpose of the data collection pri-
marily as one of external reporting; the NHS-ST programme was thus
seen as a form of performance management regime.
It feels certainly that what's coming down from above is more of a ‘this is
your benchmarking tool, you're not performing against other organisa-
tions in this way, what are you doing about it?’ and it's turned almost
into a bit of a beast which no one can ever really sort of manage. The
pressure is so great to hit all these targets, when actually the original
goal of this project was to be a local improvement tool. (Site K, Senior
Staﬀ 1)
In consequence, organisational participants characterised the NHS-
ST as functioning primarily as what we term a blame allocation device,
one that latently distributed heat – blame, shame and other unwanted
consequences – in ways that they often perceived as illegitimate and
unfair.
My biggest bugbear about it is [despite] the very clear statements […]
that it shouldn't be used to measure organisations or to compare orga-
nisations and that is exactly what it has done. (Site R, Senior Staﬀ 1)
In oﬀering these accounts, organisational participants were inter-
preting the NHS-ST within an institutional, ﬁeld-level logic of ac-
countability, which they struggled to reconcile with the logic of im-
provement promoted by the instrument's own programme theory. This
understanding was not irrational: participants drew on their experi-
ences of previous programmes, features of the NHS-ST programme it-
self, and perceptions of incongruities between the espoused programme
theory and what they saw as the reality of its operation in practice.
One feature of the NHS-ST that reinforced the view that it was a
blame allocation device was its link to ﬁnancial incentives. Though not
part of the original programme theory of the developers, incentives
were introduced at policy level and were accepted by the NHS-ST team
as necessary to move the NHS-ST beyond the pilot phase and to scale
across the NHS. In order to receive full payments linked to the NHS-ST,
organisations were required to establish a baseline, identify goals for
improvement and put changes into place to facilitate harm reduction,
and then demonstrate “special cause variation” in the rate of the four
harms that would be indicative of a change in the system over time. The
use of ﬁnancial incentives for QI as part of the NHS-ST meant that it
tended to be understood by staﬀ as part of a genre of performance
management that they saw as oppressive and punitive.
We had to have something like a 15% reduction in pressure ulcers, a
15% reduction in [catheter-associated] UTIs and falls and if you were
over that then you would get red RAG-rated and possibly a £50,000 ﬁne.
(Site R, Senior Staﬀ 1)
A second feature that suggested to organisational participants that
the NHS-ST was based in a logic of accountability rather than im-
provement was that the data were required to be reported publicly.
Collation of data potentially allowed appropriation, assembly and re-
assembly of data, potentially including the ranking and ordering of
organisations. Though in practice the data were not compiled into
“league tables”, participants in reporting organisations were highly
sensitised to the possibility that they might be compared with others –
to the extent that some talked about the NHS-ST as though it did engage
in ranking. Senior staﬀ in the reporting organisations thus repeatedly
voiced concerns that the data could be used to make unhelpful and
inaccurate comparisons between organisations, such as between com-
munity healthcare and acute hospital care, or between specialist and
more general hospitals, or between particular wards. The possible use
of the data by the media was seen as particularly threatening – no-one
wanted their organisation to be “named and shamed.”
We saw it as a comparison table with us and other trusts and hospitals,
because it was a tool to measure against, as opposed to turning that right
the way around and saying how are we failing and how can we make it
better? (Site C, Frontline Staﬀ 1)
3.3. Ambiguities of measurement and ownership
The fear that the NHS-ST functioned as a blame allocation device
had many of its origins in ﬁeld-level logics, but as we note above,
speciﬁc features of the programme itself ampliﬁed participants' per-
ceptions. These included how the programme selected, deﬁned, inter-
preted and operationalised the four harms that it aimed to measure (see
Table 1). The compromises the tool's developers had made to produce
operational deﬁnitions for each of the four harms had the unintended
consequence of undermining participants' faith in the neutrality and
objectivity of the tool, and simultaneously enhanced their perception
that it was a latent source of heat. One problem was that claims of
objectivity and scientiﬁc neutrality were challenged by the scientiﬁc
community: in interviews, the content experts praised the principle of
measurement of harm-free care, but they also argued that the individual
deﬁnitions of the four harms, as deployed in the NHS-ST, did not always
demonstrate clarity, completeness, and speciﬁcity. This meant that the
measures did not enjoy full scientiﬁc legitimacy either among experts or
among those charged with using it.
If we're going to use those four harms we need to be absolutely clear and
be completely consistent with the deﬁnition that needs to be used in the
community. At the moment it is open to interpretation in my view …. So
you know that would be my plea, that the deﬁnitions are really clear and
that the tool was relevant to that particular setting as well. (Site K,
Senior Staﬀ 1)
In the sites themselves, observations showed that data collectors
(usually, but not always, nurses) often lacked conﬁdence and certainty
in applying the deﬁnitions. Despite extensive guidance provided on the
NHS-ST website and elsewhere, substantial variability in the inter-
pretation and application of the deﬁnitions was evident. For example,
data collectors were sometimes unclear as to whether they should enter
data on all urinary tract infections (UTIs), only those when a catheter
was present, or only those UTIs deﬁnitively conﬁrmed as being ca-
theter-associated. One community-based site, contrary to guidance,
only recorded falls as occurring at the patient's home if the fall hap-
pened while staﬀ were physically present to see it: unobserved falls
were not recorded. Grading the severity of pressure ulcers, which de-
pended on the skills and experience of the data collector, was also seen
as involving substantial uncertainties that were exacerbated by the
linking of the measurement to ﬁnancial incentives.
Our [senior nurses] could be out there arguing the toss all the time, about
is it a [grade] two or is it a [grade] three. (Site S, Senior Staﬀ 2)
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… you've also got the quality of the dataset it returns. People are always
going to … especially if there's any form of ﬁnancial penalty attached to
it, people tend to start gaming to try and look as good as they can
anyway. So, for instance, one of the things with pressure ulcers is that
people try and reclassify them as things called moisture lesions. (VTE
Content Expert 1)
A particular focus of disquiet centred on recording recency of
harms, because whether a harm was counted as “new” or “old” was
critical to taking ownership of the harm and responsibility for im-
provement. Thus, for example, “old” pressure ulcers were deﬁned by
the guidance as those that were present on admission or that developed
within 72 hours of admission, while falls were similarly deﬁned as oc-
curring when there was evidence of a fall in a care setting (including at
home, for district nursing caseloads) in the last 72 hours. Our ob-
servations and interviews showed that the deﬁnitions were not always
applied or interpreted consistently between or even within sites, in part
because of reluctance to own the harms: though the programme doc-
umentation disavowed a role of “attribution” of harms, new harms were
eﬀectively ascribed to the reporting organisation for the purposes of
improvement.
[Interviewer: Do you record old pressure ulcers or falls if they happened
in another care setting?] No. (Site S, Frontline Staﬀ 1)
[Interviewer: So do you record all the pressure ulcers or falls that hap-
pened in another care setting?] Yes. But falls have to be within three
days. (Site S, Frontline Staﬀ 2)
3.4. Fairness
Participants emphasised that fairness should inform the collection
and use of data. Here, fairness describes the perceptions of frontline and
senior staﬀ in organisations of how far they believed that they were
responsible for the harms they were being asked to record, not being
blamed for the failings of others, and not being compared unjustly with
others. Participants argued they should only be held accountable for
harms over which there was some reasonable prospect that they might
exercise agency. But they expressed substantial concerns about the
fairness of the data collected by the programme and whether any
comparisons that might be made across organisations would reﬂect
individual clinical contexts. One concern was that other organisations
might “game” the system in some way, leaving those who played by the
rules exposed to unwarranted blame.
We didn't want to dob anybody in it for a better word but we felt ag-
grieved that actually other trusts weren't doing it in the same way. This
was when we found out some trusts did it over three days. Some Trusts
did it after they made sure all the patients went home in the morning.
None of this intelligence ever comes out when you have one of these little
national conferences. (Site R, Senior Staﬀ 1)
A more frequent concern, however, was that the distinctive patient
populations served by particular organisations made it diﬃcult to
compare them fairly with others, meaning that eﬀorts at commensur-
ability (transforming diﬀerent qualities into a common metric) and
comparability across diﬀerent settings were seen as fraught with the
potential for heat.
I think sometimes it's hard to benchmark yourself against other trusts,
sometimes you are measuring apples and pears and the deﬁnitions are
still not clearly understood I don't think nationally, so you can be trying
to compare yourself to somebody who is measuring something completely
diﬀerent. (Site G, Senior Staﬀ 1)
For a local population, sometimes these things can have a negative impact
in that people will say “ooh why is our hospital so bad” but are we
comparing like with like? So for example [another local hospital] or a
specialist hospital that doesn't have an A&E will have a very diﬀerent
proﬁle and yet they're all in this together. (Site H, Senior Staﬀ 2)
A further important source of disquiet among participants in the
sites centred on disputes about which organisation was responsible for
reporting particular harms. Many questioned to what extent the tool,
and the data derived from it, could meaningfully be used for im-
provement given ambiguities around where and with whom responsi-
bility for any harm lay, and to what extent any harm was ultimately
preventable. The equivocations that participants identiﬁed in de-
termining what counted as a particular instance of a harm, its severity,
and its recency could not be reported in the data themselves, which
appeared tabulated in spreadsheet form devoid of contextual informa-
tion. Those in the sites were concerned that these data then became
available for scrutiny, judgement, and blame, without any evidence
remaining of the underlying local (and social) practices involved in
producing them.
So they could come out of hospital and we [district nursing team] are not
seeing them, and then we go in at 72 and a half hours and that's [deemed
to be a new pressure ulcer] developed in our care. If we saw them at 71
hours that would be deemed out of our care [as an old pressure ulcer],
because… [district nurse interrupts:] It would have come out of hospital.
(Site C, Frontline Staﬀ 1 + 3)
Though intended to allow an assessment of the number of harms
occurring at the level of the entire health economy, these ambiguities of
attribution were deeply resented by organisational participants, who
felt that they were having to taking the heat for harms that they saw as
arising elsewhere or over which they had very limited control.
I think that's what's kind of turned me oﬀ a little bit - if it's happened
here, it's happened here and we should take accountability, but how can
we take accountability for things that haven't happened here? (Site H,
Senior Staﬀ 1)
If we don't know if it was on our watch, do we class it as on our watch or
not on our watch? So therefore do we class it as avoidable or unavoid-
able? (Pressure Ulcer Content Expert 4)
Accordingly, the assumptions made by some organisational parti-
cipants were substantially at odds with the logic promoted by the NHS-
ST: rather than revealing areas for improvement and enabling action,
participants saw the tool as constructing apparent failings so that they
could be unfairly blamed.
[The matron] said, “My ward is being judged by that [recorded harm].
And it's just not fair because this happened on somebody else's patch, it's
just that they [the patient] happened to be on my ward at the time [of
measurement]”. (Site H, observations)
4. Discussion
Measurement is foundational to a safe, high quality healthcare
system, but the tension between blame and accountability has proved
diﬃcult to resolve (Wachter and Pronovost, 2009; Aveling et al., 2016).
A reasonable hypothesis is that QI programmes that promote low-blame
approaches may encourage healthcare workers to see measurement as
more facilitative of local change. This study explored a QI programme -
the NHS Safety Thermometer - that sought to engage in a distinctive
form of blame engineering (Hood, 2011): protecting local staﬀ from
blame in order to support local improvement to reduce patient harm.
The NHS-ST was founded explicitly in a logic of measurement for im-
provement, and eschewed a role for blame. However, the context of its
introduction was one where a dominant institutional logic is that of
accountability. Inﬂuenced by the so-called New Public Management
(Martin et al., 2016), with its emphasis on performance management
and often harsh discipline (Bevan and Hood, 2006), it was this logic of
accountability, rather than the programme theory of blame-free im-
provement-oriented measurement, that most strongly inﬂuenced
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perceptions of the NHS-ST. Frontline staﬀ who were the target of the
programme largely regarded the NHS-ST not as providing neutral, ob-
jective instrumentation that would take the temperature of safety in
their organisations and support improvement, but as a latent means of
exposing them to the heat of blame. Their perceptions that the NHS-ST
functioned as a blame allocation device were powerfully inﬂuenced by
their experiences of how the institutional logics operated in relation to
other large-scale quality improvement programmes (Brewster et al.,
2016). Their inferences were not irrational: while it may contain par-
allel and sometimes conﬂicting professional, patient and political nar-
ratives, the ﬁeld-level logic of accountability and discipline supplied
frames of reference, ways of thinking, and strongly patterned beliefs
that led organisational participants to understand the programme in
highly determined ways. Speciﬁc features of the programme itself, in-
cluding public reporting, ﬁnancial incentives, and ambiguities about
deﬁnitions, appeared to embody dissonances with the programme
theory and amplify the tendency for organisational participants to
identify the NHS-ST as conforming to the template of performance
management, rich in the potential for blame, not as the supportive and
neutral measurement tool intended by its developers. Thus, though the
NHS-ST has been associated with improvements in care (Buckley et al.,
2014), the mechanism through which the improvement has happened is
unlikely to be that of blame-free learning.
These ﬁndings have important implications for those seeking to
design and implement QI programmes. In a constellation of logics
(Goodrick and Reay, 2011), those underpinning a programme theory
may be at risk of being outshone by others that are more established
and pervasive, particularly when the programme theory is substantially
misaligned with the ﬁeld-level logic. This suggests that those designing
QI programmes should be attentive to institutional logics, since, as
Healy puts it:
Institutions carry the criteria which people use to assess a policy's success,
or the procedures for assessing alternatives to it, or the methods for
implementing decisions that ﬂow from it. Any of these may become so
taken–for–granted that they appear to be the only rational way of doing
things. This in turn aﬀects the range of alternatives that may be presented
as ‘realistic’ possibilities. (Healy, 1998:63)
This may be an especially important lesson in the context of mea-
surement in healthcare, where, in practice and policy, the arc of mea-
surement has persistently bent towards use of data for accountability:
regulators, funders, and others operate performance management sys-
tems that depend crucially on reporting of quantiﬁed data and reward
(or more typically punish) accordingly. New schemes of measurement,
whatever the intentions of their developers, may ﬁnd it diﬃcult to es-
cape being categorised as more of the same. They may be especially
challenged when, as in the case of the NHS-ST, features of the pro-
gramme itself increase the resemblance to performance management
regimes. These features may themselves be a working out of the in-
stitutional logics, suggesting that a programme theory may become
distorted by the interpenetration of those logics with its own logics.
Thus, for example, the NHS-ST team promoted openness in the sharing
and use of data but the vehicle used for this, public reporting, is a
performance instrument and was therefore misaligned with the pro-
gramme theory. The potency of the public reporting mechanism may
have contributed to the undermining of the claim, in the eyes of or-
ganisational participants, that the data were not for accountability. A
second reason that the NHS-ST assumed the features of a performance
management regime in the eyes of organisational participants was the
linking of ﬁnancial incentives to the establishment of robust data col-
lection systems and to improved outcomes. The NHS-ST represents the
largest data collection of its kind in the world, having collected data on
around 14 million patients. It is not clear how well the NHS-ST would
have succeeded in promoting a blame-free approach had it not been for
these compromises in the programme theory, and this will be an im-
portant focus in the study of future QI programmes.
This study further suggests that programme designers and devel-
opers need to be highly attentive to local understandings of whether
responsibility and agency are correctly and fairly attributed (Poteete,
2010) by methods of measurement (Mannion et al., 2004, 2005; Dixon-
Woods et al., 2014). Highly relevant to staﬀ perceptions of the NHS-ST
as a blame allocation device were the ambiguities introduced by prin-
ciples intended to make the NHS-ST easy to use in multiple care set-
tings. For many frontline workers, the data did not accomplish the
objectivity, neutrality and assurances of fairness necessary to secure
their conﬁdence that unwarranted blame would be evaded. Local data
collection procedures varied, sometimes signiﬁcantly, and staﬀ at all
levels had reservations about the accuracy and comparability of the
data. The potential for the four harm deﬁnitions of the NHS-ST to be
interpreted or applied diﬀerently in diﬀerent settings led to (legitimate)
concerns about the commensurability of the data. These were com-
pounded by lack of clarity about who “owned” responsibility for a
particular harm, the extent to which it was avoidable, and lack of
clarity about how local improvement might be driven without causal
attribution of any harm recorded. In the absence of such clarity, many
expressed concerns that they or their organisation might be held ac-
countable – blamed – for harms that were unavoidable or caused
elsewhere, or that inappropriate comparison with other organisations
might make theirs look worse than it really was, as has also been found
in other studies – for example in relation to infection control (Brewster
et al., 2016) and national audit (Taylor et al., 2016).
Future eﬀorts to design improvement programmes that reduce the
risk of blame should seek to design approaches that minimise features
of performance management. It may be diﬃcult to design measurement
schemes that achieve the twin goals of low burden of collection and
high validity and reliability, but the risks associated with pragmatic
deﬁnitions need to be managed. Further, it is clear that a sound, well-
reasoned programme theory, while necessary, may not be suﬃcient for
achieving goals for improvement in healthcare systems dominated by
institutional logics that run counter to that theory. Other strategies may
be helpful, for example institutional entrepreneurs, social movements,
large-scale policy change, or ground-level changes in the ecology of
practice (Berman, 2012). Though the NHS-ST programme did draw on
some of these, maintaining the integrity of messages about a focus on
‘data for improvement’ remained challenging to achieve.
4.1. Strengths and limitations
This qualitative evaluation combines data from multiple sources. Our
interviews with the NHS-ST developers were carried out after the pro-
gramme was well into implementation and it is therefore possible they
represent a rationalised account of the programme theory articulated with
the beneﬁt of hindsight. However, these interviews were not the ﬁrst or
only instance in which the principles underpinning the programme have
been articulated: we also drew on programme documentation from past
years and reports of the NHS-ST's development (Power et al., 2012,
2016). We were able to undertake observations and interviews in a large
and diverse sample of organisations, although we of course could not visit
all wards or teams within these. It also proved diﬃcult to recruit NHS
senior leaders. Combining interviews with observations during site visits
allowed us to both explore people's views and opinions as well as see what
they actually did in practice. We were unable to assess the impact of our
presence on what we observed. While only one researcher visited each
organisation, we de-briefed our visits as a team – sharing observations,
reﬂections and insights in a bid to develop a sophisticated and nuanced
understanding of what we were seeing.
5. Conclusions
This study has lessons for those designing and implementing
healthcare improvement interventions, especially in cases where the
principles underpinning these run counter to, or actively seek to
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disrupt, established logics: it may be diﬃcult to design interventions,
measurement systems or programmes that buck wider organisational
and institutional contexts. However sound a programme theory in its
goals and proposed mechanisms, wider organisational and institutional
conditions may frustrate its achievements. Promotion of a logic of
measurement for improvement may remain challenging as long as a
logic of accountability remains a dominant feature of the institutional
ﬁeld.
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